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Abstract 
Large population / rapidly growing economies such as China and India have argued that in 
the upcoming UNFCCC negotiations in Copenhagen, any emission reduction targets they take on 
should be based on their intensity of emissions (emissions/$GDP) on a target date not the level of 
emissions. They argue that this will allow room for their continued high growth, and level 
commitments in the presence of sharply differential growth between OECD and non-OECD 
economies represent asymmetric and unacceptable arrangements. Much of the policy literature 
agrees with this position, also arguing that while there is equivalence between commitments if 
growth rates are certain, where growth rates are uncertain equivalence breaks down. However, no 
explicit models or experimental design are used to support this claim.  
Here we use a modeling framework in which countries face a business as usual (BAU) 
growth profile under no mitigation, and can mitigate (reduce consumption) and lower temperature 
change but with a utility loss. International trade enters through trade in country differentiated 
goods, and the impact of mitigation on country welfare depends critically on the assumed severity 
of climate related damage. We then consider cases where country growth rates are uncertain, and 
compare the impacts of levels versus intensity commitments, with the latter made equivalent in the 
sense that expected emissions are the same. There are different senses of this equivalence; global 
equivalence with differing country impacts, or strict country by country equivalence. Under 
intensity commitments there is more variation in both consumption and emissions than is the case 
with level commitments, and we show cases where level commitments are preferred to intensity 
commitments by all countries. Whether this is the case also depends upon how growth rate 
uncertainty is specified. We are also able to consider packages of mixed level and intensity 
commitments by country which might be the outcome of UNFCCC negotiations.  Outcomes can 
thus be opposite to prevailing opinion, but it depends on how the equivalent targets are specified. 
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1. Introduction  
A central difference in the form of commitment which has been debated for 
upcoming global negotiations on climate change in Copenhagen in December 2007 is 
between absolute commitments to reduced annual levels of emissions (on a flow basis 
such as per year) as measured on an agreed commitment date, and relative 
commitments to reduced levels of emissions per unit of GDP, again as measured on 
an agreed commitment date. Developing countries argue that such forms of 
commitment are necessary for them given their high growth, and also commitments of 
this form will encourage them to become more energy and emission efficient more 
quickly. 
In this paper, we take up the issue of level versus intensity commitments in a 
formal analytical structure. It is widely agreed that in the certainty case there is an 
equivalence between the two commitment forms. For any level target an intensity 
target exists whose impacts will be identical. The critical differences arise with 
uncertainty over growth rates, autonomous reductions in energy conversion efficiency, 
technical progress, and other considerations.  
While much of the policy based literature (see Pizer (2005)) argues in favor of 
intensity commitments on the grounds it leaves more emission room for high growth 
countries, little of it explicitly compares the two commitment forms in well specified 
experiments. In the presence of uncertainty as to growth performance, intensity 
commitments will typically generate more variance in both output and emissions for 
equivalent level commitments with the same expected emissions reduction across the 
two commitment forms, but at the same time there are differing senses of equivalence. 
For instance, equivalence may hold only globally so that expected global emissions 
are the same, while country emissions on an expectations basis vary, or equivalence 
may hold more strictly on a country by country basis. 
We use a general equilibrium model applied to a multi decade business as usual 
(BAU) scenario in which global output determines emission levels, and countries 
trade country specific goods with both goods and temperature change entering 
preferences. Countries can forgo use of their own good to meet targets, reducing 
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emissions with a welfare gain from temperature change and welfare loss from reduced 
consumption. We use an eight region structure (China, India, Russia, Brazil, US, EU, 
Japan, Rest of the World) which we calibrate to a Business as Usual (BAU) scenario 
over 50 years. We are able to compare intensity to level targets being used by all 
countries, being used by a subset of countries (China, India, Russia, Brazil) while 
others use level targets, or only by individual countries (China, for instance). The 
higher variance of output and emissions can make intensity commitments unattractive 
for countries compared to levels commitments when strict country equivalence holds, 
although individual country impacts also reflect terms of trade effects. Significant 
differences across countries apply when looser global equivalence is used. What 
stands out is the difference in perspective relative to the policy based discussion in 
that details of equivalence assumed in the experiment and how growth rate 
uncertainty is specified matter for country impacts. Numerical results are also 
sensitive to the assumed damage from climate change and model parameters used. 
 
 4
2. Level versus intensity commitments 
In December 1997, more than 150 countries concluded negotiations on the Kyoto 
Protocol, a landmark agreement on global climate change. Signed by 84 countries, 
including the United States, the treaty committed industrialized countries to legally 
binding limits on their emissions of greenhouse gases that are linked to global climate 
change. These limits were expressed as reductions (or, in a few cases, increases) in 
absolute emissions levels relative to a 1990 baseline.  
Developing countries took on no commitments under Kyoto and countries were 
divided into two groups; Annex A with commitments and Annex B with no 
commitments. This was seen at the time as an interpretation of the principle of 
“Common but Differentiated Responsibilities” applying to developing countries and 
adopted as part of the earlier 1994 UN Framework Convention on Climate Change.  
Kyoto commitments terminate in 2012 and with the end of the Kyoto 
implementation period, the focus has now shifted to arrangements for a post Kyoto 
world and further negotiations under UNFCCC which are to conclude in Copenhagen 
in December 2009. In these negotiations the participation of large population rapidly 
growing developing countries (China, India, Brazil, Russia) is seen as key as their 
emissions will progressively come to dominate global emissions if their (pre crisis) 
high growth rates continue. These countries, in turn, cite not only common but 
differentiated responsibilities, but also their need for growth and development as the 
basis for them taking on different forms of commitment compared to developed 
countries. 
Level (or absolute) emissions targets typically specify a percentage reduction in 
the amount of carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gases (Kg of carbon Dioxide 
equivalent) to be released on a flow basis on a specified date. Intensity (or relative) 
emissions target reductions involve a percentage reduction in the amount of emissions 
relative to some measure of output (such as GDP) usually stated in dollar or local 
currency terms, on a specified date. The commitment in both cases is to percentage 
reduction by some specified date relative to an earlier base date.  
Level commitments were the mechanism used in the 1997 Kyoto Protocol and 
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are also widely used in other treaty arrangements (such as the Montreal Protocol on 
CFC’s). Intensity commitments have attracted growing attention in global 
negotiations on greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions due to arguments from rapidly 
growing large population economies (China, India, Russia, Brazil) that they need 
room to accommodate high growth and that this points to emissions intensity targets. 
Intensity-based limits which restrict emissions to some pre-specified ratio relative to 
input or output are much more widely used in domestic environmental regulation.  
Intensity targets can be interpreted as performance standards. For a company, the 
standard maybe relative to company total sales or relative to units of a good produced. 
For a country, the standard is typically specified as tons of carbon dioxide equivalent 
relative to country GDP. If emissions intensities are used the choice of exchange rate 
in calculating US$ dominated GDP becomes a critical issue. This is especially 
important for China and India due to large differences in the dollar measure of GDP 
depending upon whether or not purchasing power parity or market exchange rates are 
used.  
Both the form of commitment and the target date for any commitments in the 
second round of global emissions reduction negotiations to conclude in Copenhagen 
in December 2009 are at this point unresolved. The Bali 2007 UNFCCC documents 
contained language suggesting indicative targets of a 25-40% reduction by 2030. 
Developing countries have raised the issue of the form of commitment not only in 
terms of levels versus intensity but also as it relates to other issues such as the 
treatment of emissions embedded in exports. In the G8, there has been discussion of 
50% cuts by 2050. Chancellor Merkel has also been associated with proposals for 
targets for maximum temperature change (2) by 2050. 2050 targets might also be 
accompanied by intermediate targets, say a 30% cut by 2030, and a 20% cut by 2020.  
Available literature on the intensity / level issue stresses that in the presence of 
certainty the two commitment forms are equivalent, in the sense that for any level 
commitment, an equivalent intensity commitment can be found with the same impacts. 
It is where growth and any autonomous reductions in energy conversion efficiency are 
uncertain that differences rise.  
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Pizer (2005) argues that absolute emissions targets are too constraining in face of 
unexpectedly high growth and too lax in face of unexpectedly low growth, and that 
intensity targets better accommodate unexpected growth and favor developing 
countries. His arguments reflect four key claims: that greenhouse gas emissions will 
continue to rise over the near term, that absolute targets emphasize zero or declining 
emissions growth while intensity targets do not, that developing countries’ economic 
development is integrally tied to emissions growth for the foreseeable future, and that 
intensity targets are not any more complicated to administer than levels targets.  
Ellerman and Wing (2003) also discuss the differences between these two forms 
of emission targets, arguing like others that the two forms have identical effects in a 
world where future emissions and economic output (i.e. GDP) are known with 
certainty. They show that outcomes for emissions and welfare only diverge when the 
variance of GDP diverges from its forecast expectation. They then argue that intensity 
targets reduce the importance of what is the most important unknown for any country 
considering the cost of meeting emission targets; future economic performance. Their 
conclusion is that if uncertainty about the effects of absolute targets impedes 
agreement or causes existing agreements to unravel, then some form of indexation of 
targets to economic growth seems both desirable and necessary to enable agreements 
to be made.   
Jacoby et al. (1998) also argue that intensity targets are more compatible with the 
overall architecture of environmental agreements. They argue that an absolute cap is 
only a limiting form of emission targets in which the degree of indexation to GDP 
growth is a choice variable. They suggest that the widespread use of intensity targets 
in environmental regulation, including some use as an instrument to reach Kyoto 
targets by parties adhering to the Protocol, suggests that more attention should be paid 
to this than in the past. 
Our point of departure relative to this literature is to argue that in any comparison 
of the economy wide performance of level versus intensity targets, a basis for the 
comparison is needed in clearer analytical terms. Precedents for such comparisons lie 
in the tax literature where the efficiency and distributional impacts of alternative tax 
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structures are compared on an equal yield basis. Here, the natural experiment would 
seem to be to consider uncertainty in, say, the growth rate of countries comparing a 
business as usual scenario (with uncertainty in emissions levels) to outcomes under 
emissions targets in level (absolute) and equivalent intensity form, calibrated such that 
expected emissions levels are the same across the two forms of limitation. We also 
argue that there are differing forms of equivalence. One might be where the expected 
global emissions intensity reduction is the same but with the same absolute reduction 
in intensity country differences apply in proportional reductions, and another might be 
where equivalence of expected proportional emissions intensity applies on a country 
by country basis. 
While emission intensity targets may be argued as inconsistent with 
arrangements under the Kyoto Protocol, there is no reason why the form that targets 
take cannot change from one environmental negotiation to another.2 For more than a 
decade, international climate negotiations have focused on absolute emissions targets 
and timetables. The result has been a system that is biased toward halting and 
reversing emissions growth, even as evidence suggests that emissions will continue to 
grow for decades in industrialized countries and much longer in the developing world. 
This bias arises because progress viewed in terms of emissions inevitably means 
emissions reductions—not slowing growth of emissions. Shifting the focus of the 
negotiation towards intensity targets can thus be defended as opening the door to more 
inclusive negotiations where a range of approaches—including slowing, stopping, or even 
reversing emissions growth—can be discussed. Intensity targets can then be interpreted as 
performance standards for the whole economy.  
The question remains whether intensity-based emissions targets offer a preferable 
alternative to level emissions targets both globally and for individual countries. Do 
intensity targets better accommodate growth and make targets for developing countries 
more likely to be acceptable than absolute emissions limits? Or do intensity targets 
instead increase the expected variance of both emissions and output and increase 
                                                        
2 Some would even abandon entirely the targets-and timetables architecture of the Kyoto Protocol and replace it 
with agreements on R&D expenditures and technology transfer (Barrett, 2001) or with a global carbon tax (Cooper, 
1998). 
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uncertainty relative to level targets? What is needed is experimental analysis to 
investigate, with the same expected reduction in emissions whether the expected 
utility under intensity limits will be higher or lower than that in the certainty case. 
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3. Model Structure and Experiment Specification 
We use an extended version of a multi country modeling framework recently 
developed by Tian, Whalley & Cai (2009) in which the effects of alternative climate 
change policies relative to a BAU scenario can be assessed over many years 
considered as a single period. Into this, we introduce uncertainty of country growth 
rates and compare the expected welfare differences involved using comparable level 
and intensity targets as counterfactual model experiments. We specify the intensity 
equivalent experiments in different ways, with varying forms of uncertainty of 
country growth rates as well as expected global equivalence in terms of expected 
emission. In one case there are equal absolute reductions in intensity with country 
differences in expected proportional reductions, and in the other equal proportional 
intensity reductions and country by country equivalence in proportional expected 
reductions. We are also able to compute the distributional implications of using one 
form of intensity target over another. 
The model considers multiple regions (China, India, Brazil, Russia, US, EU, 
Japan, Rest of the World). Each region is endowed with a single good and goods are 
heterogeneous across countries (the Armington (1969) assumption). Countries export 
their own good, and import the other country goods. Country utility is defined over 
consumption of goods and temperature change. In the model countries can reduce 
global emissions by forgoing consumption since emissions are linked to the total 
value of consumption world wide. In this way, countries can induce lowered world 
temperature change which benefits all, but at a cost to themselves in terms of foregone 
consumption.  
We use data on consumption and trade for the eight economies, along with 
country growth rate data for 2000-2006. We forward project BAU scenarios 
alternatively to 2036 and 2056, using various damage and temperature change 
assumptions as our BAU case. This base data is thus for a single 30 or 50 year period 
2006-2056 with assumed yearly growth rates over the period. We calibrate the model 
to a temperature change function for prospective changes in temperature under the 
three growth scenarios out to 2056. In these we use varying estimates of associated 
damage reported by Stern (2006) and Mendelsohn (2006). 
In the model, we introduce uncertainty in the form of three different growth 
scenarios: BAU growth and a higher and lower growth scenario for each region. Our 
BAU growth rates reflect average annual country growth rates over the period 
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2000-2006 projected forward. We consider one case where high and low growth rates 
reflect the same percentage deviation in country growth rates across all countries. We 
consider an alternative case where growth rates for high and low growth scenarios 
reflect averages of above and below mean growth rates for the period 2000-2006.  
For simplicity, we assume that the high and low growth scenarios occur in each 
case with equal probabilities. We then use these to assess the impacts of different 
emission reduction targets: comparing the BAU outcome without any emissions 
reduction to a 20% level target reduction in country emissions; and to alternative 
intensity targets that are equivalent to the absolute target in terms of expected impacts 
on emission levels specified both globally and by country. We compute the welfare 
level under the BAU scenario and under the high and low growth scenarios in each 
case for both absolute and intensity targets. This allows us to assess whether the 
expected welfare of the two weighted average cases in the level target case is higher 
or lower than in the intensity target case. 
 
3.1 Temperature change and top level country utility functions 
We analyze a single period of a number of years during which each of the 
economies we analyze grows at a compounding constant rate. Each country is 
assumed to have one heterogeneous good whose availability also grows at this rate in 
the base case (BAU). We assume that consumption of the good by the country directly 
generates emissions of carbon which, in turn, raises global temperature. Countries 
generate positive utility from consumption of goods, but negative utility from 
temperature change. Countries have an upper bound on their own use of their good 
(consumption plus export) reflecting the BAU scenario. If they use less than the upper 
bound they experience less temperature change, as do all other countries. If they are 
small, their own actions have little or no effect on temperature change. 
We analyze the impacts of emissions reductions over a given period of time 
which we consider as a single period which covers either 30 or 50 years. There are no 
explicit dynamics. For this period, we focus on changes in consumption (of both own 
and foreign goods via international trade) and utility, and measure changes in these 
variables relative to the outcome of zero growth over the period. The utility function 
is thus defined over 30 or 50 year changes in consumption and temperature change. 
The potential use of the own good by an economy can thus be thought to reflect 
changes in potential output from the economy over 30 or 50 years. We first analyze a 
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business as usual (BAU) scenario which reflects current observed growth rates 
remaining unchanged over 30 or 50 years, and with no global or single country 
emissions limitation initiatives in place, and then consider alternative high and low 
growth cases. We then compute model solutions under alternative emissions 
reductions for each scenario.  
The utility of each country in all cases is reflected in a utility change function 
with argumentsgiven by the country’s own change in composite consumption as well 
as the temperature change of the world. We assume the utility change function for 
each country has a Cobb-Douglas form given by (1).  
( , ) *( )i i i
H TU U RC T RC
H
β− ΔΔ = Δ Δ Δ = Δ                 (1) 
In this specification, iRCΔ represents the change in consumption for each 
country i (i=1,…,N). iRCΔ  is, in turn, a composite of their own good and other 
country’s goods which they acquire by exporting their own good and importing other 
country’s goods. This structure can thus be used to also analyze links between trade 
penalties (tariffs) and financial transfers and participation in emission reduction 
initiatives. 
H can be thought of the global temperature change at which all economic activity 
ceases (say 20℃). As TΔ  approaches C utility goes to zero, and as TΔ goes to zero 
there is no welfare impact from temperature change. Utility change over the model 
period (2006-2036 or 2005-2036) increases as temperature change falls. The share 
parameter β  reflects the severity of damage (in utility terms) from any given 
temperature change. We calibrate the model to various damage estimates from 
business as usual global temperature change reported by Stern (2006) and 
Mendelsohn (2006), and this procedure determinesβ .  
Global temperature change, in turn, is determined by the change in carbon 
emissions over the period across all countries in the model. We adopt a simple 
temperature change function and assume that emissions by each country equal the 
change in consumption times country emissions intensity (emissions/GDP) so as to 
allow for differing emissions intensities by country. Defining the emissions intensity 
of region i as ie , we use a simple power function (2) for global temperature change 
due to changes in emissions by all countries over the model period. 
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 ( ) ( )bi i i i
i i
T g e RS a e RS cΔ = Δ = Δ +∑ ∑ (2) 
where iRSΔ represents the change in the use ( consumption plus export) of the own 
good for each country i. We treat the ei as exogenous and constant over the period, but 
the structure can be extended to also incorporate an exogenous improvement in 
emissions intensity overtime reflecting increased efficiency of energy conversion. 
Consumption across all regions of each country own good is less than iRSΔ  because 
of international trade. iRSΔ  in turn is less than or equal to the upper bound iRSΔ  
associated with the base case scenario as countries lower use of their own good to 
meet emissions targets.  
 
3.2 Composite consumption goods by country 
In this structure, a carbon reduction commitment by a single country implies a 
reduction in consumption, and this has both negative and positive effects on utility 
change for countries over the model period. On the one hand, a reduction in 
consumption lowers utility for the country, but on the other hand, country 
consumption reductions lower global emissions and hence world temperature change, 
and increases the utility both of the country reducing the emissions and all other 
countries. 
The composite consumption good iRC  is a CES function of domestic and 
imported consumption goods, similar to the nested CES Armington functions in trade 
models (see Whalley (1985)). The model effectively becomes an Armington N good N 
country pure trade economy in which the endowment of each region is variable and 
temperature change enters utility.  
The demands for consumption goods reflect the outcome of sub utility 
maximization.  
   Max 
1 1 1 1
1
1 2( , ) (( ) ( ) )
i i
i i i i iRC RC D M D M
σ σ σ
σ σ σ σ σλ λ
− −
−= = +    (i=1…N)      (3) 
         s.t. w m wi i i i i i ip D p M I p RS+ ≤ =       (i=1…N)                (4) 
where iD and iM represent consumption of the domestic and a composite imported 
good respectively with wip and 
m
ip as their prices, 1
iλ  and 2iλ  as the consumption 
shares, and σ  as the substitution elasticity. The composition of iM  is determined 
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by a third level of nesting in the model, and mip  is a price index of seller’s prices 
w
jp (see equation (9)). iI  is country income and is given by sales of own good iRS  
at the world price wip .  
  Demands for domestic consumption goods and a composite of imported 
consumption goods are:    
2
(1 ) (1 )
1 2( ) ( ( ) ( ) )
i
i m i w i m
i i i
IM
P p Pσ σ σ
λ
λ λ− −= +    (i=1…N)       (5) 
           1(1 ) (1 )
1 2( ) ( ( ) ( ) )
i
i w i w i m
i i i
ID
p p Pσ σ σ
λ
λ λ− −= +        (i=1…N)        (6) 
 
3.3 Composites of Imported Goods and Trade Equilibrium  
The CES imported composite commodities are in turn composites of imported 
goods from each supplying country. Given that each country has one good it can sell, 
but N-1 goods it imports, the CES composite of other goods defines an import 
composite. This is also the outcome of a sub-utility maximization exercise 
Max 
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1
1 2 1 1( , ,..., , ,..., ) ( ( ) ( ) )
m m
m m mi i i i i i i
i i i N j j
j i
M H R R R R R R
σ σ
σ σ σκ
−
−
− +
≠
= = ∑     (7) 
            s.t. w i m mi j i i i
j i
p R I p M
≠
≤ =∑                           (8) 
where ijR  is the imported good i by region j, 
m
ip  is the composite import price for 
region i, ijk  is the consumption share and mσ is the second level substitution 
elasticity. miI  is the income devoted to expenditures on imports from (6). These CES 
sub-utility maximizations give:
1
1
1[ ( ) ] mmm i wi j i
j i
p p σσκ −−
≠
= ∑                   (i=1…N)       (9) 
          
1
( )
( ) ( ) ( )
m
m m m
i m i m
j i i j i ii
j w i w w
i j i i
j i
p M p M
R
p p p
σ
σ σ σ
κ κ
κ −
≠
= =∑      (i=1…N)       (10) 
A trade equilibrium in the model is given by world prices *wip  for each of the 
country goods for which make clear globally, i.e 
         ii j i
j
D R RS+ =∑ ,                          ( 1,... )i N=       (11) 
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Climate change polices that affect iRS  change equilibrium prices, as do trade 
measures (tariffs) or transfers between countries used as mechanisms to generate 
participation in such agreements.   
 
3.4 High, Low and BAU growth scenarios and Model Experiments 
The model captures uncertainty in a simple way by analyzing three alternative 
growth scenarios: high growth, low growth and BAU growth. For each scenario we 
compute utility and consumption of goods by region. We consider two different 
specifications of high and low growth rates. In one there is equal percentage variation 
in growth rates across high and low growth states by country. In the other, we 
consider high growth rates as average growth rates above mean growth rates for 
2000-2006, and low growth as average growth rates below the mean. For the high and 
low growth scenarios we consider each will occur with probability one half, and we 
compute expected utility and expected emissions.  
We then introduce different emission targets for the various growth scenarios by 
using alternative forms of level and intensity target equivalence. In one case we use 
equivalence in expected emissions by country, in the other the target is loser in the 
form of equal expected emissions globally. In the first case, the global target implies 
an equi proportional reduction in intensities by country. In the second case, the 
emission level target as a common reduction in emissions intensity subject to a lower 
bound on emissions intensity. We then compute the impacts of equivalent emission 
intensity reductions which give the same expected emission reduction to be achieved 
as under emission level targets given the BAU output of the region. We thus compute 
the model utility change under high, low and BAU growth scenarios respectively for 
each of the emissions targets, and then compare expected utility for high and low 
growth scenarios across the two targets. We measure the impacts of use of one target 
relative to another using a Hicksian money metric equivalent variation of the utility 
difference expressed in $ trillion. These amounts can then be compared to the value of 
GDP (discounted where discounting earlier) over the model period (30 or 50 years) 
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4 Model Calibrations 
 
We calibrate our model to a base case business as usual (BAU) scenarios for two 
different model periods 2006-2036 and 2006-2056. We use an 8 country grouping, of 
Brazil, Russia, India, China, US, EU, Japan, and the Rest of the World (ROW). We 
construct a BAU growth profile using forward projections of 2006 data, and model 
calibration to this profile determines key model parameters.
4.1 Data Description  
We use GDP growth as the measure of potential change in consumption by each 
country over the period. We use averaged data between 2006 and 2000 to calculated 
growth rates. We first assume that under the different (BAU, high, low) growth 
scenarios, country growth rates in the period 2000-2056 remain unchanged over the 
whole period of 50 years between 2006 and 2056. All the data for each time period are 
forward projected based on the data for 2006. We have three components in our data 
for each growth scenarios: base case data in 2006, cumulative data for 2056 given 
high, BAU and low growth, and cumulative data over the period relative to the base 
year for the same three growth scenarios.  
Base year output, emissions and growth rates are reported in Table 1. China, 
India, Russia, Brazil, USA, EU, Japan and the Rest of the World (Row) have BAU 
growth rates of 0.09, 0.07, 0.07, 0.032 0.026, 0.020, 0.17, and 0.30 respectively, given 
by average growth rates of 2000 to 2006 (data from World Bank website). We use two 
different specifications of high and low growth rate scenarios since these serve to 
illustrate how the specification of growth scenario affects the comparison between 
level and intensity targets. For the first specification, high growth scenarios use 
averages of country growth rates for years between 2000 and 2006 with above mean 
growth, while low growth scenarios use averages of growth rates for years between 
2000 and 2006 with below mean growth. This yields high growth rates for China, 
India, Russia, Brazil, USA, EU, Japan and Row of: 0.105, 0.089, 0.080, 0.042, 0.033, 
0.030, 0.025, 0.037 respectively and low growth rates of 0.086, 0.043, 0.054, 0.017, 
0.016, 0.013, 0.006 and 0.020 respectively. In the second specification, we use high 
and low growth rate data in which we assume that high growth rates are a 50% higher 
than in the relevant BAU rate in all countries, and low growth rates a 50% lower than 
in the relevant BAU rate in all countries. This gives high growth rates for China, India, 
Russia, Brazil, USA, EU, Japan and Row of 0.135, 0.105, 0.105, 0.048, 0.039, 0.030, 
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0.025 and 0.045, and low growth rates of 0.05, 0.04, 0.04, 0.02, 0.013, 0.01, 0.008 
and 0.015 respectively. The larger the variance of BAU growth rates, then typically 
the larger the difference between high and low growth rates for eight countries. In the 
second specification of high and low growth rates, China, India, Russia and Brazil 
have more variation in growth rates than the developed countries.  
We use BAU growth rates to calibrate the temperature change function using 
BAU temperature change over the two periods drawing on key literature sources, 
including Stern (2006) and Mendelsohn (2007). This implies that in high growth 
scenarios emissions are larger and also temperature change is higher. Preferences 
towards goods and temperature change are determined for each country using 
alternative damage estimates from the same sources.  
 
Table 1 Output, Emission Intensity data in 2006 and Growth Rates out to 2036 and 2056 
 
 China India Russia Brazil U.S E.U. Japan ROW 
Output in 2006, trill$ 1.067 0.987 0.912 2.645 13.164 10.636 4.368 14.682 
Emission in 2006, ktonC 0.53  2.54  1.83  5.88  6.81  3.13  1.19  14.37 
Emission intensity 2006 0.500 2.577 2.012 2.222 0.517 0.294 0.273 0.979 
BAU growth rate  0.09 0.070 0.069 0.032 0.026 0.020 0.017 0.030 
High growth rate (1) 0.105 0.089 0.080 0.042 0.033 0.030 0.025 0.037 
Low growth rate (1)  0.086 0.043 0.054 0.017 0.016 0.013 0.010 0.020 
High growth rate (2)  0.135 0.105 0.105 0.048 0.039 0.03 0.0255 0.045 
Low growth rate (2)  0.045 0.035 0.035 0.016 0.013 0.010 0.009 0.015 
Note: (1) is the growth specification 1 where all rates are average of country growth rates above/below BAU 
growth for 2000-2006. (2) is the growth specification 2 where growth rates are a 50% higher / lower in all BAU 
country growth rates for 2000-2006.  
 
4.2 Calibration of preference parameters  
We first turn to the calibration of preference parameters. According to the Stern 
Review (2006), Mendelsohn (2006) and other literature, the damage cost of emissions 
with BAU paths ranges from 1 to 20% of GDP out to 2050. We treat damage from 
climate change in the model as a utility change of the same proportion over the same 
time and use it to calibrate the preference parameters in the model. Without 
temperature change, the utility function is: 
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           *i iU RC=                                   (12) 
    And with damage we have :  
          * / ( )i i
H TU U
H
β− Δ=                           (13) 
With temperature change, there will be a loss from damage. We can thus calibrate 
β  using equation (13) above for given different values of H. A time period of 50 
years as the base case yields the β  values reported in Table 2. In our simulation 
analysis, we use H=10 as the base case, and perform sensitivity analysis with H=20 
and H=30. 
We next turn to the temperature change function. The temperature change function 
is written as a function of emission changes. We treat it as a power function of total 
emission (not output) change for the world:   
        ( )bi
i
T a EΔ = Δ∑                         (14) 
   Based on the results from Stern Review (2006), the BAU path of emissions will 
lead to about 3 degree temperature increases around the year 2035, and near 5 degree 
C by around 2050. For simplicity, we assume that zero growth in the global economy 
will lead to no temperature change.  
With the data on growth rates and emission intensities for each country under the 
BAU growth scenarios, we can calibrate the parameters a and b. We have data for 
year 2006 and projections emission and output data for 2036 and 2056. For simplicity, 
we choose 2006 as the base year, and assume that 30 years later, that is by 2036, the 
global average temperature will increase by 3 degrees, and 5 degrees by 2056. We 
assume that the BAU path implies output growth for each country comparable to that 
of 2000-2006, while emission intensities are unchanged from 2006. We are able to 
relax this assumption to allow for autonomous (exogenous) improvements in energy 
efficiency (intensity) overtime. Table 2 also reports the calibrated values of a and b. 
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Table 2 Calibration Model Parameters for 50 Year Time Horizon  
 
H 
β  in preferences a, b in temperature change 
function assuming  
2036 3TΔ =  2056 5TΔ =  
BAU Damage cost 
assumed β  
10 
10% 0.152 
a=0.304 
 
b=0.296 
20% 0.322 
50% 1.000 
20 
10% 0.366 
20% 0.776 
25% 1.000 
30 
10% 0.578 
16.7% 1.000 
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5. Results of Model Experiments 
 
Using the 2 alternative specifications of high and low country growth rates, and 
the two different specifications of equivalence between level and intensity targets, we 
can make 4 calculations of country welfare under alternative emission reduction 
targets. We can then compute expected utility under level and intensity targets for 
each country for each of 4 specifications (with differences in the sense of equivalence 
of the intensity target, and the setting of high and low growth rates). We can also 
compare the distributional implications across countries in the sense of intensity 
equivalence (absolute or proportional). We can also compare how other model 
features, such as timeframe, commitment level, and assumed BAU damage from 
climate change impact the choice of emission target both by country and globally.  
Table 3 reports the reductions in emission intensity over the model period 
implied by alternative level equivalent experiments. This intensity reduction is an equi 
proportional reduction of 20% in emissions intensity implemented over the whole of 
the model period of either 30 or 50 years, equivalent in expectations form to a 20% 
level reduction. The second reduction is an equal absolute reduction in emissions 
intensity calculated to give the same expected global reduction as both the level 
commitment and the other intensity commitment. We use a lower bound of an 80% 
absolute emission intensity reduction to preclude country cases (EU & Japan) where 
emission intensity reductions would otherwise be negative.  
 
Table 3  Percentage Changes in Base Year (2006) Intensity by Country  
Under Alternative 20% Level Equivalent Reduction3 
Country 
BAU 
Emission 
intensity 
In 2006 
Reduction 1 
Emission intensity over model 
period after proportional reduction 
equivalent to  
20% level reduction in emission 
Reduction 2 
Emission intensity over model period 
after absolute reduction (subject to 80% 
lower bound) in equivalent intensity 
target to 20% level reduction in emission 
China 2.22  20% 15% 
India 2.01  20% 16% 
Russia 2.58  20% 13% 
Brazil 0.50  20% 65% 
US 0.52  20% 62% 
                                                        
3 The reductions in intensity by country in each case are calculated so as to generate equal expected reductions in 
emissions. 
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EU 0.29  20% 80% 
Japan 0.27  20% 80% 
Row 0.98  20% 33% 
 
In Table 4 we report welfare impacts by country of emission reductions in the 
certainty case for two alternative reductions of 20% and 30% as this provides a basis 
for comparison of the alternative intensity commitments in the growth uncertainty 
cases. It has been acknowledged in literature for some time that only with large BAU 
damage costs from climate change countries individually benefit in narrow self 
interest terms from climate change reduction. Here we assume a 10% damage 
estimate in calibrating the model and in both 20% and 30% reduction cases all 
countries lose. Proportional to size China loses the most reflecting both its size and 
high emission intensity. The issue with levels versus intensity targets in this case is 
thus under which instrument are expected losses larger or smaller, and for which 
country. 
   Table 4 Incremental Utility from Goods Consumption and Climate Change with and 
Without Emission Reductions Targets in the Certainty Case (2006-2056)4 
 
 
BAU scenario 
No target 
20% level reduction for all 
countries  
30% level reduction for all 
countries 
China 1900.403 1877.75 1857.49 
India 280.44 277.684 274.987 
Russia 231.972 228.708 225.983 
Brazil 56.903 56.149 55.504 
US 484.571 480.962 476.871 
EU 240.304 238.746 236.836 
Japan 92.656 91.64 90.697 
Row 607.638 598.289 590.751 
 
In Table 5, we report welfare comparisons in money metric terms for the use of 
level and the two intensity equivalent commitments for the period 2006-2056 as well 
as the differences between the two intensity equivalent commitment forms. Welfare 
                                                        
4 Assuming 10% damage from climate change in the BAU case.  
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measures are in Hicksian money metric form over the whole model period of 50 years. 
We use the two different specifications of equivalence (equal proportional, equal 
absolute) discussed earlier. We also use the two different growth rates scenarios set 
out above. 
These results indicate how both for individual countries and globally these 
comparisons can produce either level or intensity preference. Globally, under 
high/low growth specification (1) proportional intensity targets are preferred to level 
targets but this result is reversed under high/low growth specification (2). Under 
growth specification (2) all countries gain from the use of a level target relative to an 
equivalent intensity target, reflecting the added uncertainty created by intensity targets. 
All countries except China gain from intensity targets with the alternative 
specification of high and low growth rates.  
Results for the comparison of proportional and absolute intensity commitment by 
country show significant distributional variation by country. Countries with high BAU 
intensities (China, India) are considerably worse off with proportional intensity targets 
and the US and the EU are much better off. 
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Table 5 Welfare Differences in Level and Equivalent Intensity Reduction Commitments by All Countries under Different Growth Rate and Equivalence 
Specification (2006-2056) 5 
Hicksian CV measure ($trill) 
 
 Growth Specification (1) Growth Specification (2) 
Country 
Difference between 
level and equivalent 
proportional intensity 
commitment 
Difference between 
level and equivalent 
absolute intensity 
commitment 
Difference between 
equivalent proportional 
and equivalent absolute 
intensity commitment 
Difference between 
level and equivalent 
proportional intensity 
commitment 
Difference between 
level and equivalent 
absolute intensity 
commitment 
Difference between 
equivalent proportional 
and equivalent absolute 
intensity commitment 
China 1.093 -8.074 -9.167 40.153 23.322 -16.831 
India -0.474 -2.03 -1.556 2.339 0.53 -1.809 
Russia -1.14 -2.65 -1.51 1.15 0.273 -0.877 
Brazil -0.323 2.5 2.823 0.01 0.013 0.003 
US -1.974 14.45 16.424 6.598 60.963 54.365 
EU -0.217 13.7 13.917 0.624 28.714 28.09 
Japan -0.457 5.24 5.697 1.224 9.311 8.087 
Row -1.588 10.08 11.668 10.38 25.483 15.103 
                                                        
5 Growth rate specification (1) uses average growth rates above and below mean for 2000-2006. Growth rate specification (2) uses growth rates 50% higher and 50% lower than BAU growth 
rates.  
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Table 6 reports results for the same comparison as in Table 5, but where the 
timeframe is varied to run from 2006-2036 instead of 2006-2056. These welfare 
comparisons report lower numbers in $ trillion for the shorter timeframe since the 
economy is smaller in size, but under growth rate specification (2) the gains from 
using proportional intensity targets while still all positive, are proportional to GDP 
lower. For growth rate specification (1), these are 4 results of change in sign in the 
comparison, and 4 cases where loses increase in size. Under absolute equivalence a 
similar picture of change emerges, emphasizing the sensitivity of these comparisons 
to specification. 
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Table 6 Varying the Timeframe Used to Compare Level and Equivalent Intensity Commitments Given Different Growth Scenarios and Forms of 
Intensity/Level Equivalence 6 
Hicksian CV measure ($trill) 
 
  Growth Specification (1) Growth Specification (2) 
Country year 
Difference between 
level and equivalent 
proportional intensity 
commitment 
Difference between 
level and equivalent 
absolute intensity 
commitment 
Difference between 
equivalent proportional 
and equivalent absolute 
intensity commitment 
Difference between 
level and equivalent 
proportional intensity 
commitment 
Difference between 
level and equivalent 
absolute intensity 
commitment 
Difference between 
equivalent proportional 
and equivalent absolute 
intensity commitment 
China 
2056 1.093 -8.074 -9.167 40.153 23.322 -16.831 
2036 -15.695 -0.763 14.932 5.257 4.335 -0.922 
India 2056 -0.474 -2.03 -1.556 2.339 0.530 -1.809 
2036 -1.621 -0.31 1.311 1.107 -1.647 -2.754 
Russia 
2056 -1.14 -2.65 -1.51 1.15 0.273 -0.877 
2036 -3.829 0.04 3.869 0.069 -0.059 -0.128 
Brazil 2056 -0.323 2.50 2.823 0.01 0.013 0.003 
2036 -1.530 0.79 2.32 0.026 1.035 1.009 
US 
2056 -1.974 14.45 16.424 6.598 60.963 54.365 
2036 3.004 0.09 -2.914 0.457 11.070 10.613 
EU 2056 -0.217 13.70 13.917 0.624 28.714 28.09 
2036 5.291 3.44 -1.851 0.09 6.033 5.943 
Japan 
2056 -0.457 5.24 5.697 1.224 9.311 8.087 
2036 0.388 1.26 0.872 0.258 1.365 1.107 
Row 2056 -1.588 10.08 11.668 10.38 25.483 15.103 2036 -28.482 2.72 31.202 -6.385 -4.071 2.314 
  
                                                        
6 Growth rate specification (1) uses average growth rates above and below mean for 2000-2006. Growth rate specification (2) uses growth rates 50% higher and 50% lower than BAU growth 
rates. 
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In Table 7 we report results for variations in the depth of commitment in 
comparisons between level and level equivalent intensity targets for the same 2 
growth rate specifications and the two cases of absolute and proportional equivalence. 
In these cases, for growth rate specification (2), the welfare gain accruing to countries 
in level equivalent intensity target specification from using proportional intensity 
equivalence increases sharply for all countries with deeper commitments, except the 
US. For growth rate specification (1) for 7 of 8 losses become gains; China is the 
exception. Similar changes occur for absolute rather than proportional senses of 
equivalence, and for the US relative loses from absolute equivalent targets increase.
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Table 7 Varying the Commitment Reduction Level in Comparison of Level and Equivalent Intensity Commitments Given Different Growth Scenarios 7 
and Forms of Level Equivalence in Intensity targets 
Hicksian CV measure ($trill) 
  Growth Specification (1) Growth Specification (2) 
Country Reduction level 
Difference between 
level and equivalent 
proportional intensity 
commitment 
Difference between 
level and equivalent 
absolute intensity 
commitment 
Difference between 
equivalent proportional 
and equivalent absolute 
intensity commitment 
Difference between 
level and equivalent 
proportional intensity 
commitment 
Difference between 
level and equivalent 
absolute intensity 
commitment 
Difference between 
equivalent proportional 
and equivalent absolute 
intensity commitment 
China 
20% 1.093 -8.074 -9.167 40.153 23.322 -16.831 
30% -1.072 -13.351 -12.279 60.249 37.652 -22.597 
India 20% -0.474 -2.03 -1.556 2.339 0.530 -1.809 
30% 1.858 0.09 -1.768 3.455 1.407 -2.048 
Russia 
20% -1.14 -2.65 -1.51 1.15 0.273 -0.877 
30% 1.164 -1.03 -2.194 1.378 0.065 -1.313 
Brazil 20% -0.323 2.50 2.823 0.01 0.013 0.003 
30% 0.182 3.33 3.148 0.066 4.539 4.473 
US 
20% -1.974 14.45 16.424 6.598 60.963 54.365 
30% 0.923 20.92 19.997 5.219 71.64 66.421 
EU 20% -0.217 13.70 13.917 0.624 28.714 28.09 
30% 1.459 12.9 11.441 0.629 23.722 23.093 
Japan 
20% -0.457 5.24 5.697 1.224 9.311 8.087 
30% 0.31 5.08 4.77 1.888 8.646 6.758 
Row 20% -1.588 10.08 11.668 10.38 25.483 15.103 30% 5.548 24.47 18.922 16.868 40.659 23.791 
 
                                                        
7 Growth rate specification (1) uses average growth rates above and below mean for 2000-2006. growth rate specification (2) uses growth rates a 50% higher and 50% lower than BAU growth 
rates. 
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In Table 8, we report results where we instead compare the welfare impacts of 
mixed packages of level and intensity commitments to the outcome under common 
20% level reduction commitments. As this is a potential outcome from the 
Copenhagen negotiations, these results are of special interest.  
For proportional equivalence under both growth scenarios (1) & (2) we show 
loses to the BRIC countries (Brazil, Russia, India, China) and gains to the large 
OECD (EU, US, Japan). Under growth scenario (2) these effects are large. Under 
absolute equivalence, the losses to BRIC are smaller and under growth scenario (1) 
for absolute equivalence gains occur. 
If intensity targets are restricted in their use to China, under growth scenario (1) 
gains accrue to China and losses to all others for both absolute and proportional 
equivalence. Results reverse for growth scenario (2).  
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Table 8 Welfare Impacts of Mixed Commitments of Level and Equivalent Intensity Commitments Relative to 
Common Level Commitments by Country for Different Growth Scenarios 8 and Senses of Equivalence 
Hicksian CV measure ($trill) 
 
BRIC take 
on intensity, 
others level 
commitments 
BRIC take 
on intensity, 
others level 
commitments
China takes 
on intensity, 
others level 
commitments
China takes 
on intensity, 
others level 
commitments
BRIC take 
on intensity, 
others level 
commitments 
BRIC take 
on intensity, 
others level 
commitments
China takes 
on intensity, 
others level 
commitments
China takes 
on intensity, 
others level 
commitments
(Proportional 
Equivalence) 
(1) 
(Absolute 
Equivalence) 
(1) 
(Proportional 
Equivalent) 
(1) 
(Absolute 
Equivalent) 
(1) 
(Proportional 
Equivalent) 
(2) 
(Absolute 
Equivalent) 
(2) 
(Proportional 
Equivalent) 
(2) 
(Absolute 
Equivalent) 
(2) 
China -1.302 6.04 1.739 5.976 -41.411 -26.47 -41.671 -25.574 
India -1.229 1.2 -1.304 -0.35 -2.558 -1.726 0.945 0.366 
Russia -1.291 2.62 -1.19 -0.42 -1.17 -0.516 0.358 0.156 
Brazil -0.387 2.53 -0.295 -0.08 -0.035 -3.996 0.138 0.02 
US 6.595 -0.65 -1.635 -0.77 3.803 1.413 2.543 0.241 
EU 5.961 -0.45 -0.759 -0.48 2.07 1.299 1.442 0.417 
Japan 1.933 -0.16 -0.423 -0.16 0.314 0.116 0.302 0.109 
Row 11.11 -1.44 -2.966 -1.54 -0.222 -1.814 0.487 0.377 


                                                        
8 Growth rate specification (1) uses average growth rates above and below mean for 2000-2006. Growth rate specification (2) uses growth rates 50% higher and 50% lower than BAU growth 
rates. 
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In Table 9 we report results from cases in which the BAU damage cost 
assumption used to calibrate preferences in the model is varied prior to 
comparisons of level and level equivalent intensity commitments. These cases are 
computed once again for the two different growth scenarios and under differing 
senses of equivalence. For growth scenario (1), increasing the damage cost 
increases gains and reduces losses for all countries for proportional equivalence. 
For growth scenario (2) results go uniformly in the opposite direction for 
proportional equivalence. Different results are obtained for absolute equivalence. 
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Table 9 Varying Assumed Damage Cost Used to Compare Level and Equivalent Intensity Commitments for Different Growth Scenarios and Senses of 
Equivalence  Hicksian CV measure ($trill) 
  Growth Specification (1) Growth Specification (2) 
Country Damage cost 
Difference between 
level and equivalent 
proportional intensity 
commitment 
Difference between 
level and equivalent 
absolute intensity 
commitment 
Difference between 
equivalent proportional 
and equivalent absolute 
intensity commitment 
Difference between 
level and equivalent 
proportional intensity 
commitment 
Difference between 
level and equivalent 
absolute intensity 
commitment 
Difference between 
equivalent proportional 
and equivalent absolute 
intensity commitment 
China 
10% 1.093 -8.074 -9.167 40.153 23.322 -16.831 
20% 2.266 -6.163 -8.429 19.085 4.919 -14.166 
40% 4.256 -2.594 -6.85 -16.049 -25.211 -9.162 
India 
10% -0.474 -2.03 -1.556 2.339 0.530 -1.809 
20% -0.658 -2.09 -1.432 0.95 -0.656 -1.606 
40% -0.933 -2.11 -1.177 -1.282 -2.492 -1.21 
Russia 
10% -1.14 -2.65 -1.51 1.15 0.273 -0.877 
20% -0.978 -2.36 -1.382 0.59 -0.188 -0.778 
40% -0.656 -1.77 -1.114 -0.329 -0.909 -0.580 
Brazil 
10% -0.323 2.50 2.823 0.01 0.013 0.003 
20% -0.301 2.23 1.929 -0.16 -3.401 -3.241 
40% -0.251 1.68 1.429 -0.373 2.328 2.701 
US 
10% -1.974 14.45 16.424 6.598 60.963 54.365 
20% -1.681 13.02 14.701 3.097 51.58 48.483 
40% -1.099 10.11 11.209 -2.212 34.41 36.622 
EU 
10% -0.217 13.70 13.917 0.624 28.714 28.09 
20% -0.136 12.33 12.466 -1.036 24.114 25.15 
40% 0.019 9.55 9.531 -3.555 15.637 19.192 
Japan 
10% -0.457 5.24 5.697 1.224 9.311 8.087 
20% -0.406 4.7 5.106 0.735 4.919 4.184 
40% -0.303 -2.59 -2.287 -0.068 -25.211 -25.143 
Row 
10% -1.588 10.08 11.668 10.38 25.483 15.103 
20% -0.767 9.65 10.417 9.032 -0.656 -9.688 
40% 0.686 -2.11 -2.796 6.818 -2.492 -9.31 
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Finally in Table 10, we report results where we vary elasticity parameters in the model. 
For space reasons, we limit this to results for growth specification (1) and for 
proportional equivalence. These results indicate limited sensitivity of findings in this 
dimension. 
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Table 10 Varying the Trade Elasticity used to Compare Level and Equivalent Intensity Commitments for Low Growth Variance 
Hicksian CV measure ($trill) 
 
 Base case 
Elasticity 
between 
domestic and 
foreign goods 
 
50% increase 
Elasticity 
between 
domestic and 
foreign goods 
 
50% decrease 
 
Elasticity 
across foreign 
goods 
 
50% increase 
 
Elasticity 
across foreign 
goods 
 
50% decrease 
 
(Proportional 
Equivalent) 
(1) 
(Proportional 
Equivalent) 
(1) 
(Proportional 
Equivalent) 
(1) 
(Proportional 
Equivalent) 
(1) 
(Proportional 
Equivalent) 
(1) 
China 1.093* 0.915 1.278 1.282 2.09 
India -0.474* -0.405 -0.531 -0.476 -1.68 
Russia -1.140* -0.956 -1.293 -1.101 6.10 
Brazil -0.323* -0.274 -0.363 -0.318 1.06 
US -1.974* -1.758 -2.346 -1.84 -3.94 
EU -0.217* -0.198 -0.259 -0.244 -2.64 
Japan -0.357* -0.45 -0.473 -0.402 -0.33 
Row -1.588* -1.339 -1.914 -1.274 3.46 
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6．Concluding Remarks 
 
This paper reports numerical simulation results comparing the use of level and 
level equivalent intensity commitments to carbon emissions reduction by large 
countries in potential global treaty arrangements convening potential commitment 
periods of 30 or 50 years. The current Copenhagen 2009 negotiation on a post Kyoto 
world have seen low wage rapidly growing economies, such as China and India argue 
that they should take on intensity targets rather than level targets as this will allow 
them room to grow given their prospective high GDP growth rates. There has been 
considerable policy discussion of this issue, but (to our knowledge) no work in an 
analytical framework.   
Here we use a multi country trade model augmented by temperature change 
intensity in preferences in which countries set aside part of their endowment to meet 
emissions reductions and lower utility and reduce global temperature change and 
raised utility (of all countries). This model is calibrated to two alternative BAU 
growth profiles for 2006-2036 and 2006-2056.  
The main feature of our results is that country impacts can be either positive or 
negative, and significant or insignificant depending on a range of factors. These 
include the way in which uncertainty is specified in the model via differing country 
high and low growth scenarios, the way in which level equivalence for intensity 
targets is specified, the timeframe used, the depth of commitments, and (to a smaller 
degree) elasticity values. Cases occur in which level targets significantly dominate 
intensity target for all countries, opposite to current policy opinion. Also, mixed level 
and intensity targets seem to favor rapidly growing low wage economies including 
China and India. Proportional equivalence is preferable for OECD over non OECD 
economies and vice versa for absolute equivalence. The conclusion offered is that in 
this framework unambiguous claims for level or intensity seem unsupportable, but 
insights on potential impacts can be obtained via numerical modeling once specific 
proposals and circumstances.  
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